

The Us Armymarine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Applications in Operational CultureSpreading Ink Blots from Da Nang to the DMZCassandra in OzCounterinsurgencyOn the Ground in AfghanistanGovernance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar (enlarged Edition)Knife FightsInternational Politics and PerformanceRule of Law in WarThe Accidental GuerrillaTactics in Counterinsurgency: The Official U.S. Army / Marine Corps Field Manual Fm3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98)The Sling and the StoneThe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field ManualWar and the Politics of EthicsThe Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic CultureCounterinsurgency WarfareWhat Went Wrong in Afghanistan?U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020Corporations and CounterinsurgencySmall Wars ManualCounterinsurgency and the United States Marine CorpsThe U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33. 5)The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field ManualCounterinsurgency Field ManualInvisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the PresentCounterinsurgencyU.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Paperbound)A Question of CommandCounter InsurgencyU.S. Army Counterinsurgency HandbookThe Political Impossibility of Modern CounterinsurgencyMoney in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past

Counterinsurgency (COIN) OperationsWar, Will, and WarlordsThe
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Applications in Operational Culture

Rule of Law in War places international law at the centre of the transformation of United States counterinsurgency (COIN) that occurred during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It claims international law matters more than is often assumed and more than we have previously been able to claim, contradicting existing theoretical assumptions. In particular, the book contends international law matters in a case that may be regarded as particularly tough for international law, that is, the development of a key military doctrine, the execution of that doctrine on the battlefield, and the ultimate conduct of armed conflict. To do so, the book traces international law's influence in the construction of modern U.S. COIN doctrine, specifically, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. It then assesses how international law's doctrinal interaction held up in Iraq and Afghanistan. The account of this doctrinal change is based on extensive access to the primary actors and materials, including FM 3-24's drafting history, field documents, and interviews with military officers of various

ranks who have served multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Spreading Ink Blots from Da Nang to the DMZ

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, is the first of a two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. Focusing on the suppression of insurgent or other irregular forces during overseas constabulary and contingency operations from the Civil War years up to America's entry into World War II, Andrew J. Birtle has filled an important omission in military historiography by writing about the underlying theories, concepts, and methods employed in the conduct of myriad unconventional missions with soldiers serving as governors, constables, judges, diplomats, explorers, colonizers, educators, administrators, and engineers. Even though official, codified, written doctrine for counterinsurgency, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II has long been viewed as nonexistent, Birtle uncovers through his meticulous research an evidentiary thread of continuity in the Army's performance and thus maintains that some of the central principles governing such operations were indeed incorporated into official Army doctrinal literature. The events discussed unquestionably occurred long ago, but many of the issues raised by Birtle have enduring relevance for today's Army. People,

places, and events may change, yet the fundamental questions involved in suppressing insurrections, fighting irregulars, administering civilian populations, and conducting foreign intervention remain surprisingly constant in this unpredictable world of ethnic tensions and turmoil. By studying how soldiers dealt with these complex issues in the past, Birtle's well-written account offers valuable insights to guide current and future soldiers when called upon to conduct similar operations. Military strategists, historians, and civilians interested in America's early history may find this resource appealing and offer a better understanding of Army doctrine from a historical perspective. Related products: Mexican Expedition, 1916-1917 is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00600-6> Commerce Raiding is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00282-7> From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War can be purchased here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00459-3> United States Army in World War II, War in the Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines --Print Paperback format -- is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00503-4> Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Center of Military History can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1061> "

Cassandra in Oz

This Field Manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication, "Counterinsurgency,"

establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies—some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. The manual begins with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The first chapter includes a set of principles and imperatives necessary for successful COIN operations. Chapter 2 discusses nonmilitary organizations commonly involved in COIN operations and principles for integrating military and civilian activities. Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to COIN operations. The next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those operations. Developing host-nation security forces, an essential aspect of successful COIN operations, is the subject of chapter 6. Leadership and ethical concerns are addressed in chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concerns sustainment of COIN operations, concludes the basic manual. The appendixes contain useful supplemental information. Appendix A discusses factors to consider during the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of a COIN operation. Appendixes B and C contain supplemental

intelligence information. Appendix D addresses legal concerns. Appendix E describes the role of airpower.

Counterinsurgency

4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times – in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan...As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work." – Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century – and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.

On the Ground in Afghanistan

Since the surge in Iraq in 2007, counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military and foreign affairs debates. Although COIN is not a new idea, the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to its

theory and practice as top leaders in both the government and the military have considered the most effective strategy for these conflicts. A symposium cosponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation explored the complexities of COIN leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. From that symposium came these papers, which discuss topics such as brigade and regimental command, officer development in the military, and general officer leadership. Featuring leading COIN theorists and practitioners from the military, academic, and private sectors, this volume sheds new light on past and present COIN operations and points the way toward those in the future.

Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar (enlarged Edition)

Describes the history of unconventional and nontraditional warfare from the nomads used by Alexander the Great to the shadowy modern battlefields of the post-9/11 era and featuring a diverse cast of historical tacticians and revolutionaries from Mao Zedong to Edward Lansdale.

Knife Fights

Insurgencies are at the centre of most of the conflicts that confront the modern

world, and they have been since the Second World War. Leading armies across the globe have well-developed strategies for fighting counterinsurgency campaigns which are continually adjusted and refined as a result of direct experience gained in the field. Understanding this experience and learning the right lessons from it are essential as new insurgencies break out. Perhaps this is especially important today in the wake of the attacks on America and the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is why this new edition of a pioneering survey of the subject, first published 25 years ago, is of such immediate relevance today. Editors Ian Beckett and John Pimlott brought together a team of expert contributors who provided an international overview of counter-insurgency strategies and techniques as they were perceived and put into practice a generation ago. This historical survey, which covers irregular warfare in countries as widely separated as Chad, Vietnam, Uruguay and Mozambique, will be fascinating reading for anyone studying insurgencies and the armed response to them.

International Politics and Performance

Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S.

security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.

Rule of Law in War

Contemporary Western war is represented as enacting the West's ability and responsibility to help make the world a better place for others, in particular to protect them from oppression and serious human rights abuses. That is, war has become permissible again, indeed even required, as ethical war. At the same time, however, Western war kills and destroys. This creates a paradox: Western war risks killing those it proposes to protect. This book examines how we have responded to this dilemma and challenges the vision of ethical war itself, exploring how the commitment to ethics shapes the practice of war and indeed how practices come, in turn, to shape what is considered ethical in war. The book closely examines particular practices of warfare, such as targeting, the use of cultural knowledge, and ethics training for soldiers. What emerges is that instead of constraining violence, the commitment to ethics enables and enhances it. The book argues that the production of ethical war relies on an impossible but obscured separation between ethics and politics, that is, the problematic politics of ethics, and reflects on the need to make decisions at the limit of ethics.

The Accidental Guerrilla

This book is a unique combination of intellectual history, personal memoir, and military theory. When Conrad Crane retired from twenty six years of active duty to become a research professor at the Army War College, he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to power without being heeded. As he watched the world change after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, he warned the Army that it was not prepared for “Phase IV” stability operations, counterinsurgency, and eventually the reconstruction of Iraq. Eventually his work attracted the attention of Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who along with his Marine counterpart James Mattis, was launching a broad program to make the American military a learning organization better prepared for modern war. Crane soon found himself in charge of a team of Soldiers, Marines, and civilian academics with the mission to create the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. For the next year he wrestled with conflicting ideas, complex personalities, and bureaucratic inertia to create the groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The process was long and tortuous, and much more complicated than the way it has been characterized so far in other narratives. The end result was a unique blend of traditional and modern theory, tempered by hard lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Its principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, focus on legitimacy, and concepts of operational campaign design have had immense influence on US and NATO

doctrine. The new doctrine was not perfect, and had been rushed through production in record time, but the guidance it provided would be an essential element in the Surge in Iraq that secured breathing space for the nascent Iraqi government to solve its political differences. Crane found that out when General Petraeus asked him to come observe the Surge himself in late 2007. Traveling all around that embattled nation, Crane watched the greatest counterinsurgency force the world had ever seen adapting to the exigencies of modern counterinsurgency is a very complex environment. He describes in great detail the hard work of dedicated Soldiers, Marines, and civilians that were creating a mosaic peace out of a mosaic war, in places as disparate as Baghdad, Anbar Province, and the detention facilities at Bucca. There were still problem areas, such as in the British zone and Diyala Province, but the conflict was definitely trending in the right direction. Crane closes his book with an account of what went wrong in Iraq, as the mosaic peace unraveled with the American departure, and also how the new counterinsurgency doctrine was never properly resourced or applied in Afghanistan. His final chapter covers the lessons he believes should be gleaned from the past decade and a half of global war. There have been many critics of the new doctrine, and Crane recounts their arguments and concedes that promises of counterinsurgency were oversold. But much of what has been labeled as counterinsurgency is really just modern warfare, and while the United States is understandably reluctant to engage in further irregular conflicts and nation building, they remain a growth industry in the rest of the world. The United States

government, military and civilian agencies, must be prepared to do better next time. And Cassandra says, there will be a next time.

Tactics in Counterinsurgency: The Official U.S. Army / Marine Corps Field Manual Fm3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98)

"Attacks in the Fallujah peaked in 2006 when American and Iraqi government forces struggled with a reinvigorated insurgency and the prospect of premature withdrawal by U.S. forces. Fallujah Awakens tells the story of the remarkable turnaround that followed. Journalist Bill Ardolino explains how local tribal leaders and U.S. Marines forged a surprising alliance that helped secure the famous battleground. It is one of the few books to recount events from both American and Iraqi perspectives. Based on more than 120 interviews with Iraqis and U.S. Marines, Ardolino describes how a company of reservists, led by a medical equipment sales manager from Michigan, succeeded where previous efforts had stalled. Circumstance combined with smart, charismatic leadership enabled Americans to build relationships with members of a Sunni tribe who pushed al Qaeda and other insurgents from their notoriously rebellious area"--

The Sling and the Stone

The US Army's official playbook for deception on the world's deadliest stage

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

As Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) evolved, so, too, did the Marine Corps' cultural-training efforts. Initially, cultural sensitivity training (i.e., cursory etiquette instruction) was employed in 2003, to prepare Marines for the Invasion of Baghdad during OIF I. By 2004, when the 1st Marine Division returned to Iraq for OIF II, training had evolved into culture awareness classes (i.e., introductory history, politics, religion overview). It was not until 2005 that training progressed into today's operational culture learning.

War and the Politics of Ethics

The United States Marine Corps has a unique culture that ensures comradery, exacting standards, and readiness to be the first to every fight. Yet even in a group that is known for innovation, culture can push leaders to fall back on ingrained preferences. Jeannie L. Johnson takes a sympathetic but critical look at the Marine Corps's long experience with counterinsurgency warfare. Which counterinsurgency lessons have been learned and retained for next time and which have been abandoned to history is a story of battlefield trial and error--but also a story of

cultural collisions. The book begins with a fascinating and penetrating look inside the culture of the Marine Corps through research in primary sources, including Marine oral histories, and interviews with Marines. Johnson explores what makes this branch of the military distinct: their identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens. She then traces the history of the Marines' counterinsurgency experience from the expeditionary missions of the early twentieth century, through the Vietnam War, and finally to the Iraq War. Her findings break new ground in strategic culture by introducing a methodology that was pioneered in the intelligence community to forecast behavior. Johnson shows that even a service as self-aware and dedicated to innovation as the Marine Corps is constrained in the lessons-learned process by its own internal predispositions, by the wider US military culture, and by national preferences. Her findings challenge the conclusions of previous counterinsurgency scholarship that ignores culture. This highly readable book reminds us of Sun Tzu's wisdom that to be successful in war, it is important to know thyself as well as the enemy. This is a must-read for anyone interested in the Marines Corps, counterinsurgency warfare, military innovation, or strategic culture.

The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

This book continues to tell the story of the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in what were called "Small Wars" beginning after World War II with their advisory efforts

with the Netherlands Marine Korps (1943-1946); The book is a detailed look at the Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency efforts during the Korean War (1950-1953); the development of vertical assault in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s in Vietnam; Marine Corps Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia, 1962 thru 1975; involvement in Central America 1983-1989; and the current conflicts including the War on Terror, Operations Iraqi Freedom and 'Enduring Freedom', Libya; U.S. marine Corps force structure, 1980-2015, and a special chapter on marines and War Dogs in combat operations. Based on extensive research and analysis, the book illustrates the Marine Corps' contribution to the current, on-going efforts in the Middle East and Africa in combatting global terrorism.

Counterinsurgency Warfare

In recent years we have witnessed an increasing convergence of work in International Politics and Performance Studies around the troubled, and often troubling, relationship between politics and aesthetics. Whilst examination of political aesthetics, aesthetic politics, and politics of aesthetic practice has been central to research in both disciplines for some time, the emergence of a distinctive 'performative turn' in International Politics and a critical return to the centrality of politics and the concept of 'the political' in Performance Studies highlights the importance of investigating the productivity of bringing the methods and approaches of the two fields of enquiry into dialogue and mutual relation.

Exploring a wide range of issues including rioting, youth-driven protests, border security practices and the significance of cultural awareness in war, this text provides an accessible and cutting edge survey of the intersection of international politics and performance examining issues surrounding the politics of appearance, image, event and place; and discusses the development and deployment of innovative critical and creative research methods, from auto-ethnography to site-specific theatre-making, from philosophical aesthetics to the aesthetic thought of new securities scenario-planning. The book's focus throughout is on the materiality of performance practices—on the politics of making, spectating, and participating in a variety of modes as political actors and audiences—whilst also seeking to explicate the performative dynamics of creative and critical thinking. Structured thematically and framed by a detailed introduction and conclusion, the focus is on producing a dialogue between contributors and providing an essential reference point in this developing field. This work is essential reading for students of politics and performance and will be of great interest to students and scholars of IR, performance studies and cultural studies.

What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?

Since 20 December 2001 - the date which marked the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Government - hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers from around 50 different states have

physically been and served in Afghanistan. Roughly 20 rotation periods have been experienced; billions of US dollars have been spent; and almost 3,500 coalition soldiers and 7,400 Afghani security personnel have fallen for Afghanistan. In this badly-managed success story, the true determiner of both tactical outcomes on the ground and strategic results was always the tribal and rural parts of Muslim-populated Afghanistan. Although there has emerged a vast literature on counterinsurgency theories and tactics, we still lack reliable information about the motivations and aspirations of the residents of Tribalised Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs) that make up most of Afghanistan. The aim of this book is to describe some on-the-ground problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in TRMEs - specifically in rural Afghanistan - and then to propose how these efforts might be improved. Along the way, it will be necessary to challenge many current assumptions about the conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Most generally, the book will show how counterinsurgency succeeds or fails at the local level (at the level of tactical decisions by small-unit leaders) and that these decisions cannot be successful without understanding the culture and perspective of those who live in TRMEs. Although engaging issues of culture, the author is not an anthropologist or an academic of any kind. He is a Muslim who spent his childhood in a TRME - a remote village in Turkey - and he offers his observations on the basis of 15 years' worth of field experience as a Turkish Special Forces officer serving in rural Iraq, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Cultures in these areas are not the same, but there are sufficient similarities to suggest some

overall characteristics of TRMEs and some general problems of COIN efforts in these environments. In summary, this book not only challenges some of the fundamentals of traditional counterinsurgency wisdom and emphasizes the importance of the tactical level - a rarely-studied field from the COIN perspective - but also blends the firsthand field experiences of the author with deep analyses. In this sense, it is not solely an autobiography, but something much more.

U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less

effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America's injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.

Corporations and Counterinsurgency

David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone

who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots- including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.

Small Wars Manual

A template for the defeat of insurgents seeks to define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, discuss its principles, and outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.

Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps

Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.

The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941

This is the new U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) manual on how to combat organized movements that seek to overthrow governments through subversion and armed conflict. Coauthored by Army General David Petraeus and Marine Corps General James Amos, this manual -- the first of its kind published in 20 years by the Army and 25 years by the Marine Corps -- gives the latest information about the tactics, doctrine and goals of dealing with violent insurgencies. The manual describes methods and principles that can be applied to COIN operations anywhere, although it's obvious that events in Iraq and Afghanistan are what have prompted its creation. Many of the examples refer to other insurgencies throughout history (e.g., IRA, Bolsheviks, Vietnam) to illustrate key points. A carefully crafted mix of historical studies and contemporary experience, this manual is sure to become the standard by which COIN doctrine and tactics will be judged for many years.

Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33. 5)

During the United States involvement in the war in Vietnam, the decision by the US Marine Corps to emphasize counterinsurgency operations in coastal areas was the cause of considerable friction between the Marines and the army commanders in

Vietnam, who wanted the corps to conduct more conventional operations. This book will examine the background to the Marines decision and place it in the context of Marine Corps doctrine, infrastructure and logistical capability. For the first time, this book brings together the Marine Corps background in counterinsurgency and the state of contemporary counterinsurgency theory in the 1960s - combining this with the strategic outlook, role, organization and logistic capability of the Marine Corps to provide a complete view of its counterinsurgency operations. This book will argue that the US Marine Corps successfully used counterinsurgency as a means to achieve their primary aim in Vietnam the defense of three major bases in the coastal area in the north of the Republic of Vietnam and that the corps decision to emphasize a counterinsurgency approach was driven as much by its background and infrastructure as it was by the view that Vietnam was a war for the people . This book is also an important contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency, which is now seen by many in the military doctrine arena as a flawed or invalid concept following the perceived failures in Iraq and Afghanistan - largely because it has been conflated with nation-building or democratization. Recent works on British counterinsurgency have also punctured the myth of counterinsurgency as being a milder form of warfare - with the main effort being the well-being of the population - whereas in fact there is still a great deal of violence involved. This book will bring the debate back to basics by providing an historical example of counterinsurgency in its true form: a means of dealing with terrorist or guerrilla warfare at an operational level to achieve a

specific aim in a specific area within a specific period of time."

The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In *The Soul of Armies*, Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army. Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, *The Soul of Armies* demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

Counterinsurgency Field Manual

This Field Manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)- an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.

Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written in 2006, is a guide for the Army and Marine Corps to all counterinsurgency tactics and operations, designed for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first manual on counterinsurgency in 20 years for the Army and 25 years for the Marines, this book contains information on intelligence, integration of civilian activities, campaign design, execution, security, and

sustainability, among other things. A fascinating read for anyone interested in military history and tactics. The U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, also known as TRADOC, was founded in 1973, to train the soldiers and civilian leaders of the U.S. Army, to develop operational policy, and to anticipate future operational needs of the Army. The U.S. MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND is responsible for training and indoctrinating the Marine Corps, cultivating war fighting abilities to make marines ready for combat. Training areas include leadership, education, organization, and requirements development.

Counterinsurgency

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Paperbound)

This books provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units-teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions-have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan.

A Question of Command

An influential Army officer traces the Gulf War experiences that shaped his perspectives on the changing nature of conventional combat and his then-discounted views about terrorism, citing his role in coauthoring the military's new counterinsurgency field manual. 30,000 first printing.

Counter Insurgency

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Handbook

The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency

Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.

Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

After relatively successful military interventions in Iraq in 1992 and Yugoslavia in 1998, many American strategists believed that airpower and remote technology were the future of U.S. military action. But America's most recent wars in the Middle East have reinforced the importance of counterinsurgency, with its imperative to "win hearts and minds" on the ground in foreign lands. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has studied and experimented with the combined action platoon (CAP) concept used from 1965 to 1971 by the Marine Corps in Vietnam. Consisting of twelve Marines, a medic, and dozens of

inexperienced local militiamen, the American contingent of CAPs lived in South Vietnamese villages where they provided twenty-four-hour security and daily medical support for civilians, and fostered social interaction through civic action projects, such as building schools, offices, and wells. *Defend and Befriend* is the first comprehensive study of the evolution of these platoons, emphasizing how and why the U.S. Marine Corps attempted to overcome the inherent military, social, and cultural obstacles on the ground in Vietnam. Basing his analysis on Marine records and numerous interviews with CAP veterans, author John Southard illustrates how thousands of soldiers tasked with counterinsurgency duties came to perceive the Vietnamese people and their mission. This unique study counters prevailing stereotypes and provides a new perspective on the American infantryman in the Vietnam War. Illuminating the fear felt by many Americans as they served among groups of understandably suspicious civilians, *Defend and Befriend* offers important insights into the future development of counterinsurgency doctrine.

War, Will, and Warlords

A Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus, Kilcullen's vision of war dramatically influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq. Now, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror.

The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency—a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.

The Soul of Armies

A first of its kind, this book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty

officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."

The Counterrevolution

Multinational corporations can be significant actors in zones of violent conflict. Corporate actions to shape their environment can sometimes mitigate conflict, but

as the authors show in their case studies, corporate activities can help generate and sustain violence.

Fallujah Awakens

A distinguished political theorist sounds the alarm about the counterinsurgency strategies used to govern Americans Militarized police officers with tanks and drones. Pervasive government surveillance and profiling. Social media that distract and track us. All of these, contends Bernard E. Harcourt, are facets of a new and radical governing paradigm in the United States--one rooted in the modes of warfare originally developed to suppress anticolonial revolutions and, more recently, to prosecute the war on terror. *The Counterrevolution* is a penetrating and disturbing account of the rise of counterinsurgency, first as a military strategy but increasingly as a way of ruling ordinary Americans. Harcourt shows how counterinsurgency's principles--bulk intelligence collection, ruthless targeting of minorities, pacifying propaganda--have taken hold domestically despite the absence of any radical uprising. This counterrevolution against phantom enemies, he argues, is the tyranny of our age. Seeing it clearly is the first step to resisting it effectively.

Defend and Befriend

Counterinsurgency Leadership

Annually, CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian publishes a series of papers on U.S. military forces—their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. The overall theme of this year’s report is the struggle to align forces and strategy because of budget tradeoffs that even defense buildups must make, unrelenting operational demands that stress forces and prevent force structure reductions, and legacy programs whose smooth operations and strong constituencies inhibit rapid change. This report takes a deeper look at the strategic and budget context, the military services, special operations forces, DOD civilians and contractors, and non-DOD national security organizations in the FY 2020 budget.

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